Introduction
The practical problem of trying to understand the transition has focused attention on the nature of the firm in a capitalist economy and on the role of corporate governance in catch-up growth and for economic performance more generally. The limited capacity of economic theory to provide an explanation for the different patterns of ownership and control of companies across mature market economies is matched by the relatively small volume of empirical research investigating the relationship between the structure of ownership and control and performance.
It is possible that, in time, the experience of transition economies will provide vital information for the development of a coherent theory of ownership and control. A common marketization shock has been imposed on existing enterprises in more than two dozen countries. A great variety of privatization methods have been adopted within and across countries, creating the basis for the analysis of the performance of firms with different ownership structures at a point in time as well as that of firms as they move from one ownership category to another over time.
The aim of this chapter is to take stock of the state of research that analyses enterprise sector restructuring, the emergence of postprivatization structures of ownership and control and their implications for performance. The first section below sets the scene by presenting a selective survey of recent literature from outside transition studies addressing the issue of corporate governance and its role in economic performance. The second section turns to the transition economies and presents a simple two-stage framework into which the bulk of the theoretical and empirical work on enterprise sector reform in transition can be fitted. In stage one, the marketization shock occurs and its implications for enterprise restructuring are examined; in stage two, privatization occurs and the implications for performance of the post-privatization ownership structure are investigated. The third section takes up the issue of empirical testing by reviewing the evidence on post-privatization performance. Attention is given to what can be learnt about the process of privatization as well as about its effects through the proper statistical treatment of the problem of selection implicit in comparing results from different types of privatization. The final section draws the results from the Western and transition literatures together.
Setting the scene: corporate governance in market economies Table 7 .1 presents a summary of some recent approaches to the study of corporate governance in market economies. The majority of the discussion of corporate governance in transition economies, with its emphasis on the problems of managerial entrenchment and the paucity of external finance for investment, has been conducted along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny. Their definition of corporate governance is a narrow one. They see it purely in the context of the problem of the supply of external finance to firms. An agency model is used where the firm is a private body defined by a set of principal-agent relationships. Different systems of ownership are represented by different dominant principal-agent problems: a system characterized by dispersed ownership is one in which the owner-manager relationship presents the central corporate governance problem; in a system characterized by concentrated ownership, the key problem is that between the large shareholder and minority investors. In each case, external finance will only be provided by, respectively, outside or minority investors if the manager or the large shareholder can undertake not to exploit their private benefits of control. These private benefits range from outright theft to empire building to staying on the job when they are incompetent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Shleifer and Vishny propose that a functional system of corporate governance will be one in which there is ownership concentration to enforce profit-seeking behaviour: this will be straightforward in a system with a large shareholder but will occur through the mechanism of the hostile takeover in a system with no controlling shareholder. The other requirement for efficiency is that the legal rights of suppliers
